In Part 2 of a 3 Part Series, We Examine Free Agency Moves of Bryan Colangelo
The story of how we got here is conflicting and full of inconsistencies. The Philadelphia 76ers ended up hiring Bryan Colangelo as President of Basketball Operations in the end, but that was not the goal of the team initially. When the team sought “sage counsel” from NBA commissioner Adam Silver, they were looking specifically for an Advisor, not an Executive.
"“Bryan Colangelo, who of course has ultimately ended up as president of basketball operations for the 76ers, was someone at the time that Josh excluded as a possibility because it was clear that Bryan was looking for a full-time job as the head of basketball for one of our teams,” Silver said. “So in essence, the 76ers ended up with Jerry because Bryan was not an option at the time.”"
So, Bryan Colangelo was not an original option for the Philadelphia 76ers, because he wanted a full time job in charge of an NBA team. Initially, the 76ers wanted someone to come onboard and advise them. So, Adam Silver said, he connected them with Bryan Colangelo’s father Jerry.
"“His getting directly involved with the 76ers was in part due to my reaching out to Jerry,” Silver said. “Not because it was necessarily my idea that the 76ers needed an adviser. But once Josh Harris, the principal governor of the 76ers, said he would like to have a sounding board, someone with league experience, I was the one who connected him with Jerry Colangelo”"
History
Now this is all history, but it’s important to grasp the fact that the team did NOT originally seek a replacement for Hinkie, but simply some way to gauge him, govern him, to effectively make his methods more “NBA friendly” to the remainder of the league. But from the moment he arrived, Jerry Colangelo stressed the importance of a “basketball mind”. But what is that exactly, and how does that enhance the chances of a championship.
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Well, let’s start with a basketball mind. Basketball Mind is that pedigree of competitive basketball athletics from the collegiate, pro, or international level, that other executives believe is required in order to enter the club of NBA executive. Much like registering a pure bred dog with the American Kennel Club (AKC), the inclusion in a group of “basketball minds” indicates that you have been a player of the sport at a college or higher level.
I Am Sam, Sam I Am
We know that former team executive, Sam Hinkie, was not a member of that distinguished club, and was therefore never truly appreciated for the contributions he had made to the Sixers by evaluator Jerry Colangelo. But there was more of an incentive for Jerry Colangelo to give two thumbs down to anything happening in Philadelphia. You see, his son Bryan Colangelo was looking for full time NBA employment, and had just been passed over for a similar position with the New Jersey Nets.
We’ll never know what the future might have held for the Philadelphia 76ers. It was clear that the team was well positioned to do well in the 2016 NBA draft no matter who ran the team. Likely the current roster is more at risk of a major overhaul now than had Hinkie remained. But the team pulled the trigger and made the move to subjugate Hinkie to the newly arriving Bryan Colangelo. Why? What could Bryan Colangelo deliver to the Philadelphia 76ers which Sam Hinkie could not?
An NBA pedigree. In part one, we examined the trade track record of the Bryan Colangelo Era with the Toronto Raptors. In this article, we unveil his free agency activities while with the Raptors.
Next: Colangelo Track Record
Colangelo Track Record
In seven years with the Raptors, the team made just two playoff appearances – on both occasions failing to get past that first round. In 2007, the 47-win Raptors, appearing completely rebuilt for post-season under Bryan Colangelo and coach Sam Mitchell, had won awards for both the GM and the head coach. In that series, the Raptors rode Chris Bosh’s 22 points and 10 rebounds a game into post season.
Rapping On Playoff Door
The Raptors had a new, selfless style of basketball – much like that passing emphasized style in Europe – and the Raptors’ past woes in post season play finally seemed to be behind them. Until the first round, when former Raptor Vince Carter, Jason Kidd and Richard Jefferson took them out in six games. The following year, the Raptors again made an appearance, but once more were shown the door in just five games against the Orlando Magic.
Under Colangelo, the Toronto Raptors compiled a winning percentage of .423 (247-337), and the last three years Toronto’s winning percentage had slipped to .343 (79-151). Despite early bravado, the team devolved into a struggling franchise with Colangelo as the GM. His propensity for instant results sky-rocketed the Raptors initially into post-season contention, but resulted in disappointment as the team did not have sufficient depth or enough talent in the line-up.
Failure To Communicate
Chris Bosh was clearly a key player, but the general manager failed to surround him with players who would compliment his play. His path of the build, free agency and trades, resulted in quick fixes to a team without generating the type of teamwork necessary for a championship run. In fact, the results at Toronto was a perfect example of building for a team to compete, but not win, championship basketball.
Sir Charles In Charge
Looking back at personnel decisions Bryan Colangelo had made while with the Raptors, there were good and bad moments. In terms of financial management of the team in regards to players contracts and moves towards free agency, he made poor decisions. He was a mixed bag – some good and some not so good – in terms of player trades. But in the NBA draft, he has made very solid draft decisions.
Meanwhile, the voice of reason in the form of head coach Brett Brown has gone on record to be somewhat supportive of the new president. But part of that support comes with a tapping of the brakes – a tone of “easy big fella!” in his endorsement. As Colangelo fills the room with “his guys”, the voice of Brown will eventually be drowned out. But there reamins some hope that he has made his point.
Next: Addicted To The Deal
Addicted To “The Deal”
Before we proceed, we need to understand the two completely contrasting styles instilled in the most recent team presidents Sam Hinkie and Bryan Colangelo.
Sam Hinkie was a strategist. He observed the draft board for all possible moves, and like a game of chess orchestrated a series of draft selections and trades which would result in multiple transactions, multiple draft picks, and eventually arriving at the player he had covetted all along. His moves were a constantly evolving education session, each designed to build the overall value of the team by taking a known and getting more value in an “unknown” – whether an injured draft prospect, future draft picks, underachieving players, or simply absorbing another team’s salary mistakes for the price of draft picks. In a rare occasion where Hinkie was thought to make an error in judgement, he would pause and examine the details that brought him to the decision he arrived at. Learning as much as he could, he would use that new knowledge in future transactions.
Tactician
Bryan Colangelo is a tactician. He never retreats, even in the face of an error in judgement. He is enslaved to a military battle-like mindset which some have labeled “maneuver warfare”. In lay terms, he remains on the offensive. He continues to deal, continues to seek a reason to trade. In the stock market, they call it “churning”, because it gives the appearance that your stock broker is working hard for your interests. What it does, however, is simply create more broker fees for they agent, and oftentimes with an assumption of unneeded risk. Colangelo exhibits that pattern in his management style of an NBA team. To a fan base eager to appreciate the talents of a younger Colangelo, the exhibition of deals going after deals translates into a plan. But since there is an inherent risk in each deal, his eagerness to move on to the next transaction places the team in the crosshairs of unnecessary risk.
In the choice of doing something, or doing nothing, Colangelo is very much an advocate of doing something.
Double Edged Colangelo
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But the reality is that Colangelo’s tactical methods can go both ways, sometimes buying something on the cheap and getting excellent value. But far too often he pays retail or above, and gets little value from the deal. In those cases, rather than sit on the roster, he discards the player at a deep discount and goes right back to the NBA shelves, trying to find another bargain deal. When you screw up a basketball decision, it can be months or years before you have a chance to fix it. You get contracts on the books that just sit there and suck the life out of the team, a contract so bad no other team will take the player, and all the while sucking good currency out of the team’s salary cap and out of the hands of more productive players. Colangelo does not like to be reminded of those mistakes.
When you are addicted to “the deal”, you win by the deal, but you just as quickly lose by the deal.
Next: Chasing a Shadow on a Cloudy Day
Chasing a Shadow On a Cloudy Day
While with the Raptors, Colangelo appeared to be chasing after other more successful teams in the NBA. In his first year, he was very successful, but just that first year. Following that, other teams adapted his easily replicated tactics to their own off-season methods. During the era when NBA teams were stacking their rosters with big-name free agents, Colangelo was trying to fight a battle to sign big agents to a small market franchise.
He gave the appearance of someone trying to short-cut the road to the top, while other teams either had more money to toss at free agents, or had more success in growing talented players on their rosters and then used that core to attract a big name or two. The year Bosh jumped from the Raptors to the Heat, LeBron James joined the Miami Heat as well, and two years later Miami won the NBA title. But the Miami Heat was merely following the blueprint set by other teams, like the Boston Celtics, whose overload of NBA talent in 2007 helped to speed up the Raptors’ decline. In Toronto, Bryan Colangelo only knew one speed, a fast-paced tactical method of signing names to leap other teams.
Risks Being Outbid and Outdid
But the NBA is a copycat league, and as soon as teams observed the success Colangelo had in 2006 loading up the Toronto Raptor Roster, they simply outbid and outdid him in subsequent years. And that is the risk in whatever strategy he employs with the Philadelphia 76ers. If he is successful, unless the Sixers have a huge lead on the rest of the NBA, they will quickly find themselves in competition with far more successful teams for limited resources. That can come back to hurt the team.
Similar tactics were employed by the Phildelphia 76ers in the time of head coach Doug Collins and general manager Tony DiLeo. They were the duo who lived in the moment, seeing the draft as an easy-bake oven which took far too much patience and time to churn out contributors for a playoff chasing NBA team like the Philadelphia 76ers.
After losing Game 7 to Boston in the hotly contested 2012 Eastern Conference semifinals, Philadelphia shook up the roster and made the bold move to acquire the double-double threat from Los Angeles in a four-team trade that cost them Olympian Andre Iguodala, rising star Nik Vucevic and draft picks.
Chase Dreams Catch Nightmares
They chased star center Andrew Bynum, and Andrew Bynum never played a game for the Sixers due to significant leg injuries.
Philadelphia also traded for Miami Heat Arnette Moultrie, giving up a protected first round pick as well as a 45th pick for the offensive rebounder. In combination with the Bynum trade, the two deals were the final nails in the coffins for the Sixers. Bynum never played for the Sixers, while Moultrie was traded away two years later to the New York Knicks.
In the end, Sixers’ ownership determined that chasing NBA championships are like chasing a shadow on a cloudy day. You can almost make it out, but by the time you arrive you find out it was never there at all. And so, the team turned to the Sam Hinkie ERA.
Next: I have met the enemy, and he is me
I have met the enemy, and he is me
Bryan Colangelo was his own worst enemy in his seven years with the Toronto Raptors. The rush to generate a playoff competitive team created a number of problems for the team, problems which developed early on and contributed mightily to the absence of the team from post-season for Colangelo’s last five seasons straight. His worst nightmare came true when he signed away the team’s salary cap money with little in return.
Since Colangelo is expected to focus on free agency and trades initially with the Philadelphia 76ers, we’ll break down those moves with the Raptors at first:
2006
Anthony Parker (3 years, $12M) – Out of the gate, the team picked up former Philadelphia 76ers Orlando Magic shooting guard Anthony Parker. He immediately filled the role of a 3 and D guy, and gave the Raptors their money’s worth. (Good Signing)
Jorge Garbajosa (3 years, $12M) – Another early signing. His first year was promising, but he was severely injured in March 2007, which shortened his rookie season. He attempted to come back in his second year, but his injury nagged and he opted to have a second operation. The team bought out his contract. (Good to Bad Signing)
Fred Jones (3 years, $11M) – One more early signing who never panned out, and was traded mid season to the Portland Trailblazers for Juan Dixon and “future considerations”. The Raptors subsequently traded Juan Dixon to the Detroit Pistons for center Primoz Brezec and cash. The more Colangelo tinkered with this deal, the worse it got for the Raptors. (Bad Signing)
2007
Jason Kapono (4 years, $20M)- Bursting with confidence from his year one success in free agency, Colangelo wanted to add veteran shooting from the perimeter, and got it out of Kapono for about a year. He never came close in value to his paycheck. During his stint with the Raptors, Kapono was hesitant to shoot, and that was the start of Colangelo’s fall from his rookie success. The Raptors were just .500 the next season, and failed to make the post-season in each of the next five years. (Bad Signing)
Jamario Moon (2 years, league minimum $854k) – Colangelo found Moon in a three day free agent mini-camp, and immediately signed him to a low-risk, high-reward contract. The small forward emerged to become a big part of the Raptors’ rotation. (Good Signing)
Next: The Good, But Mostly The Bad With Some Ugly
The Good, But Mostly The Bad With Some Ugly
2008
Jose Calderon (5 years, $40M) – Point guard Jose Calderon was certainly a favorite of the fans, selfless workaholic who delivered his all to the team. But his all was nowhere near worth the contract price, particularly in light of his poor defensive play. (Bad Signing – Overpay)
2009
Hedo Turkoglu (5 years $53M) – After what amounted to a panic play in an effort to keep power forward Chris Bosh, Bryan Colangelo traded for small forward Hel Turkoglu in a four team mega deal, and then immediately extended him on a five year deal averaging over $10M per year. The small forward ended up being a bust, did not work hard, did not care for the city, and was obviously not productive for the Raptors. He was traded to the Phoenix Suns a year later. (Ugly Extension)
Jarrett Jack (4 years, $20M) -A solid reserve point guard at a reasonable $5 Million /year. Did not crack the lineup to make a larger contribution for the team, despite the potential to do more. Eventually traded away to the New Orleans Hornets in a five player swap which had the Raptors giving up Jack, Marcus Banks, and David Anderson for guard Jerryd Bayless and forward Peja Stojacovic. (Good Signing)
2010
Linas Kleiza (4 years, $19M) – A horrible contract for the Raptors to a player who never truly delivered. This was a clear indication of Colangelo’s reactive style, signing an offensively minded restricted from agent from the Denver Nuggets, while ignoring the team’s need to bolster the defense. Kleiza was one of a string of players who tried a hand at the three slot, but never seemed to get it right for the team. He was waived under the amnesty clause in 2013 to get the Raptors below the luxury tax threshold. (Bad Signing)
Amir Johnson (5 years, $34M) – The deal was more of a matter of trusting potential of the player than giving the player a FMV contract on his production. His previous stats – averaging just 6 points and 5 rebounds per game, were not the type of production you look for in a 5 year deal averaging $6.8 Million per year, but this truly was a deal that paid dividends. He grew each year into the contract he had signed. He was the first man off the bench behind Chris Bosh, and added minutes in the vacuum of Bosh’s departure. (Good Extension)
2011
Anthony Carter (1 year. $1.35 M) – A move to fill the roster, but essentially a one year deal as Carter was waived by the team in March 2012. (Bad Signing)
Rasual Butler (1 year, $1.23 M) – Another move to fill the roster, but Butler was also waived by the team in March 2012. (Bad Signing)
Gary Forbes (2 year, $3 M) – Another short term move. The team signed forward Gary Forbes to a contract which netted him $1.5 Million for one year’s work before trading him the following July to the Houston Rockets for Kyle Lowry. (Good Signing – Let to Lowry Trade)
2012
Landry Fields (3 years, $19M) – In an effort to block a feared New York Knick’s run at free agent Steve Nash by signing Fields. The belief was that the Knicks were likely to offer guard Landry Fields to the Suns in a potential sign-and-trade for Nash, so Colangelo made a preemtive offer to Fields at a surprisingly high premium for a three-year, $19 million contract far beyond Fields value. Colangelo hoped that signing Fields would make it impossible for the Knicks to sign Nash. But Steve Nash turned the tables and elected $9 Million less to sign with the Los Angeles Lakers so that he could be closer to his children who lived in the Phoenix area. Fields, as a result, was simply a guy who was paid handsomely to sit on the pine. (Ugly Signing)
Next: Aftermath
Aftermath
Bryan Colangelo lost a great potential ally when Sam Hinkie decided to walk. In his time with the Raptors, Colangelo continued to display poor financial management with players in terms of free agency, and contract extensions – oftentimes paying premium dollars to attract their attention, a ploy he has already warned will be his calling card in his first off-season with the Philadelphia 76ers. Sam Hinkie might have helped to avoid those overpays.
While there were some good moves with Colangelo’s signings with the Raptors, particularly when he was acting to retain players on the roster, he liked to swing for the fences in his dealings. Those “big cuts” in free agency oftentimes cost the Raptors valuable salary cap space and locked the team up for years – eventually forcing the “always move forward” Colangelo to deal the player at a deep discount the following year. His was the type of personnel management that Sam Hinkie feasted on – waiting for the team to over-commit to a player in terms of salary, and then coming in as a white knight happy to absorb the overpay for a draft pick.
Colangelo Contrasts Hinkie
Perhaps that is part of the reason why Sam Hinkie did so well in dealings with other team general managers, and why he had to be expelled from the league. He was a facilitator, an agent of the Philadelphia 76ers who was more than happy to relieve other tactical minded NBA personnel executives of the suffocating limits of the salary cap, as long as that same team was willing to pay the cost of the service. Colangelo is one of the tactical minds who gets caught frequently in the bad contracts and is forced to pay for an exit.
It would have been a curious discussion if the Sixers had managed to retain Hinkie. It’s clear that his perspective is the blind spot of Bryan Colangelo’s “damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead” mantra.
If people can grow wiser with age, perhaps there is some room for hope going forward. So far we have covered the trades of the Colangelo era, as well as the free agent signings. In part three, we’ll discuss the drafting of Colengelo. But the track record of his free agent signings with Toronto fail in two very important areas:
Colangelo Reacts in Free Agency – presuming success is paramount to finding success, but not in a game of odds or random chance. Free agency is as much a game of chance as instincts. The risks of failure in an effort to sign talent seem to be discounted to the point of paralyzing the team if the move does not work out.
There is no evidence of a fundamental plan to free agency – Free agency, much like the NFL, should be used as patches in the road. Players who sign for more money to play for your team, will happily sign for more money elsewhere at the expiration of the contract to play. So, it falls to reason that the team that focuses on free agents to power their roster builds will be stuck on that slippery slope.
Next: Isaiah Canaan Is Custom Made For Ben Simmons
The Philadelphia 76ers are in need of a roster upgrade, and certainly a sprinkling of strategically targeted and signed veterans are in order. But the team cannot afford to off-load their premium blue chip prospects just because we have them, nor can they target veterans simply as a goal to “get older”. This team needs a disciplined multi-year plan, something Bryan Colangelo did not display at Toronto. But there is the last piece, the piece that Bryan Colangelo is least likely to lean upon, but is the strength of this Philadelphia 76ers team – the NBA Draft. Perhaps in looking there, we will find some courage to face the upcoming weeks.